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NOTES
An Administrative Battle of the Forms: The EEOC's Intake
Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination

Laurie M. Stegman
INTRODUCTION

In 1964, President Johnson signed into law the landmark Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 1 In this massive legislation, Congress intended to
address inequities such as the longstanding problem of employment
discrimination. 2 To improve the dismal record of American employers, 3 Congress combined the tactics of persuasion and compulsion in
an elaborate system that integrated administrative and judicial remedies.4 On one hand, legislators created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) to act as a conciliator and
to seek voluntary compliance,5 while on the other, Title VII provided
a right to pursue claims in federal court to those individuals denied
satisfaction at the administrative level. 6 The provisions that linked
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988)). ''The bill passed the Senate on June 17, 1964, by
a vote of76 to 18. On July 2, 1964 •.• the House of Representatives passed the Senate version of
the bill by a vote of289 to 126. At seven o'clock that evening, President Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in the East Room of the White House." Robert Belton, A Comparatfre
Review ofPublic and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND.
L. REv. 905, 917 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
2. See Julius L. Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII: The Continuing Challenge ofEstablishing Fair Employment Practices, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 9, 11-12
("The various forms of employment discrimination established after the Civil War created the
patterns which existed when Title VII became effective nearly 100 years later.").
3. "In 1962, nonwhites made up 11 percent of the civilian labor force, but 22 percent of the
unemployed...• Moreover, among Negroes who are employed, their jobs are largely concentrated among the semiskilled and unskilled occupations." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 27 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2513, and in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL
RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, 2122, 2148 (1968) [hereinafter EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
4. See Belton, supra note I, at 907 ("Congress substituted three enforcement processes for
cease and desist power: administrative enforcement by the EEOC, 'pattern or practice' civil
litigation by the Attorney General, and private civil actions by aggrieved persons - the 'private
attorney general.' ") (footnotes omitted).
5. "If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
6. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) ... is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge ••• the
Commission has not filed a civil action •.• or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ••• shall so notify
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these disparate approaches included the requirement that an individual follow the EEOC's procedures for conciliation before filing a claim
in court. 7 Section 706(e) of Title VII as enacted authorized an individual to bring an action against an employer only after the EEOC had
failed to obtain voluntary compliance within a maximum of sixty
days. 8 Because this right was contingent upon filing a proper charge
with the EEOC, absent unusually sympathetic circumstances sufficient
to toll the filing period, 9 failure to file a valid charge could result in
denial of both administrative and judicial relief. Commentators have
characterized this scheme as "an administrative obstacle course"
which "plac[es] the EEOC at the courthouse door." 10
As enacted in 1964, section 706(a) described the manner in which
an individual initiated action with the EEOC: "Whenever it is
charged in writing under oath by a person claiming to be aggrieved ...
that an employer ... has engaged in an unlawful employment practice,
the Commission shall ... make an investigation of such charge." 11 In
keeping with the statute, the EEOC promulgated implementing regulations on July 1, 1965, which stated that a "charge shall be in writing
and signed, and shall be sworn to before a notary public." 12 The
EEOC also fleshed out its administrative processes by injecting a preliminary step into the filing procedure. According to the 1965 regulations, the Commission would receive information from any person, but
the complainant would be assisted in filing a charge only where such
information disclosed that the person was entitled to such help. 13
Since the mid-1960s, the EEOC's enforcement power has expanded14 as has the body of regulations governing its procedures.
Under current regulations, the EEOC will consider a charge to have
the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may
be brought against the respondent named in the charge ...•
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(t)(l) (1988).
7. "A person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 may not maintain a suit for redress in federal district court until he has first unsuccessfully
pursued certain avenues of potential administrative relief." Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522,
523 (1972) (citation and footnote omitted).
8. The statute granted the EEOC 30 days to conciliate with a possible extension of up to 30
days. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
3, at 1012-13.
9. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
10. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION§ 11.2 (2d ed. 1988).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(a), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISrORY, supra
note 3, at 1011. The oath requirement currently appears in § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1988).
12. 30 Fed. Reg. 8408 (1965) (previously codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.8; codified as amended
at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9 (1991)).
13. 30 Fed. Reg. 8408 (1965) (previously codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.5; currently codified at
29 C.F.R. § 1601.6(a) (1991)). For example, the alleged acts would have to be among those
prohibited by one of the laws administered by the EEOC. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
14. Under the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which amended Title VII, the
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been filed "when the Commission receives from the person making the
charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties,
and to describe generally the action or practices complained of." 15
Further, in the view of the EEOC, a "charge may be amended to cure
technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge,"
and such amendments "will relate back to the date the charge was first
received." 16
Today the EEOC employs a two-step filing procedure embodied in
a pair of forms: the Intake Questionnaire, 17 which solicits preliminary
information, and the Charge of Discrimination, 18 which formally engages the EEOC's administrative machinery. In a typical claimant's
situation, on the first visit to an EEOC office, the individual completes
an intake questionnaire which requests her name and address, the reason for the alleged discriminatory action, a brief description of the
action complained of, and the name, address, and size of the employer.
On the basis of this submission, an EEOC official determines whether
grounds exist for the filing of a formal charge. If appropriate, the
EEOC drafts a charge and presents or sends it to the claimant for
approval and signature under oath.19
In order for this second document to be considered a valid and
timely charge, the complainant must sign it and file it with the EEOC
within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 20 In a so-called
deferral state, where the complainant has instituted proceedings with a
state or local agency with authority to enforce statutes comparable to
Title VII, the limitation period is extended to 300 days to permit
processing by the nonfederal agency. 21 Failure to meet these deadlines
EEOC is authorized to file suits in federal court in situations where it is unable to secure nn
acceptable conciliation agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1991).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1991) (emphasis added).
17. EEOC Form 283.
18. EEOC Form 5.
19. EEOC Form 5, the charge of discrimination, is considered to be verified under oath when
it is sworn to or affirmed before a notary public or other authorized person or when the charging
party signs the following statement which appears at the bottom of the form: "I declare under
penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct." Under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1988),
"[w]herever, under any law of the United States ••. any matter is required ••• to be ••• proved
by the sworn •.• oath ••• in writing ••. such matter may, with like force and effect, be ••• proved
by the unsworn •.• statement, in writing" of the preceding declaration. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a)
(Supp. 1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) (1988); see, e.g., EEOC v. World's Finest Chocolate,
Inc., 701 F. Supp. 637, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that a signed but undated EEOC charge is
valid because the "crucial aspect of the form •.. is that the person write his or her signature
under penalty of perjury.").
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (Supp. 1992).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (Supp. 1992). For an overview of the EEOC enforcement procedure, see SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 424-26. To be designated as a deferral or "706
Agency,"
the State or political subdivision [must have] a fair employment practice law which makes
unlawful employment practices based upon race, color, religion, sex, national origin or disa·

October 1992]

Note -

EEOC Charge

127

may render a claim invalid for purposes of administrative relief and
therefore judicial relief as well. Although the Supreme Court_ has held
that timely filing of a charge is not a jurisdictional requirement but
rather akin to a statute of limitations,22 federal courts dismiss numerous claims when plaintiffs, failing to comply with this procedural requirement, offer explanations insufficient to toll the filing limitations
period.
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs confronted by motions to dismiss their
claims for failure to file a timely charge have tried to rely on their
intake questionnaires which often were filed within the limitations period. 23 Such plaintiffs argue that the questionnaire should satisfy the
filing requirement, with the subsequently filed charge of discrimination
acting as an amendment which relates back under the EEOC's regulations. 24 The validity of this argument turns on the question of whether
a timely intake questionnaire that is verified after the limitations period has run may satisfy the requirement to file a sworn charge within
the statutory period, or whether the EEOC's regulations which permit
subsequent verification exceed the authority granted by Title VII.
This Note argues that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII as
reflected in its regulations is consistent with underlying statutory intent and strikes an appropriate balance between the needs of employers and employees. Therefore, Congress should amend section 706(b)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide that a charge
must be verified prior to the commencement of an EEOC investigation
but not necessarily within the statutory filing period. Part I examines
the legislative history of Title VII and its integrated procedures for
obtaining administrative and judicial relief. Part II critiques the various ways in which federal courts have attempted to resolve the conflict
between the explicit oath requirement contained in the statute and the
EEOC's implementing regulations which permit subsequent verification of a lesser submission. Part III argues that Congress should
amend the statute to coincide with the courts' movement toward a
more flexible standard. This Note concludes that the purposes of Title
VII would best be served by amending the statute to permit subsequent verification of timely filed intake questionnaires.
bility [and must have] established a State or local authority •.. that is empowered with
respect to employment practices found to be unlawful, to do one of three things: To grant
relief from the practice; to seek relief from the practice; or to institute criminal proceedings
with respect to the practice.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.70(a)(l) & (2) (Supp. 1992). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988).
22. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 386 (1982) ("Filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable
tolling.").
23. See infra Part II.
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY

This Part examines relevant portions of Title VII's legislative and
regulatory history and finds that although Congress institutionalized a
preference for conciliation, the prerequisites to filing suit were not intended to deter individuals from seeking judicial relief. In fact, a detailed examination of the legislative history reveals that securing the
right of an individual to pursue a claim in court was critical to Title
VII's enactment. Section I.A demonstrates that Title VII was preceded by federal employment discrimination programs which relied on
persuasion rather than judicial enforcement. This section also documents the concerted effort made by supporters of Title VII to ensure
an individual claimant's ability to seek judicial relief when denied satisfaction at the administrative level. Section I.B shows that Congress
provided a private right of action as part of a compromise limiting the
EEOC's role to that of a conciliator. Section I.C notes the lack of
congressional attention paid to the oath requirement and the long
existence of the EEOC's amendment policy and concludes that the
verification requirement was perfunctory and subordinate to larger
concerns. These legislative values and the goal of facilitating the
processing of EEOC claims in a uniform and equitable manner provide a basis for evaluating the courts' varied interpretations of section
706(b).

A.

The Fair Employment Practices Committees

Prior to establishment of the EEOC in 1964, a series of presidentially created committees studied and made recommendations regarding the elimination of employment discrimination. 25 The initial
impetus for the creation of the committees was a wartime labor
shortage exacerbated by the refusal of employers to hire black workers.26 The first Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC),
established in 1941 by executive order, was intended to "reaffirm[]
[the] policy of full participation in the defense program by all persons,
regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin."27 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the five-member Committee on Fair
Employment Practices to "receive and investigate complaints of discrimination" and to "take appropriate steps to redress grievances."2 8
His executive order also required the government to administer federal
vocational training programs in a nondiscriminatory manner and to
25. Belton, supra note 1, at 908-11.
26. 90 CoNG. REc. A3033-34 (1944) (statement of Rep. Dawson) ("The labor situation got
so acute that the war industries and the war movement were being retarded. The President, in
his judgment, in order to meet a war situation, in order to cure or seek to cure a glaring wrong,
appointed this Committee.").
27. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
28. Id.
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include in all government contracts a provision prohibiting employment discrimination. Over the course of its five-year existence, the
size and precise mission of the FEPC changed slightly, but it never
wielded any enforcement power.29 Presidents Truman and Eisenhower continued these efforts in a more limited manner, creating by
executive order committees to address problems of discrimination in
government contracts. 30
The Fair Employment Practices Committee of this era led to further efforts by the federal government to regulate discriminatory employment practices. 31 Members of both the House and Senate of every
Congress from 1943 to 1963 introduced bills to establish permanent
nondiscrimination committees with varying degrees of enforcement
power. 32 The battle over a bill introduced by Representative McCon29. A press release issued by the Southeastern Railroad Presidents' Conference illustrates the
inability of the FEPC to obtain compliance: "Sixteen railroads and terminal companies today
told the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, in a letter of response, that they
cannot comply with the committee's directives •.. regarding the hiring and promoting of Negro
railroad workers ..•." 89 CoNG. REc. A5454 (1943) (remarks of Rep. John E. Rankin). The
frustration of members of Congress was evident in remarks by Rep. Marcantonio regarding the
Southeastern Presidents' Conference's decision not to honor Executive Order 8802.
Instead of complying with an order which is in keeping with the war effort, instead of cooperating by using all available manpower, irrespective of race, creed, color, or national origin,
these railroad companies have seen fit to send to this Congress a message misrepresenting
what has been done and at the same time attacking the fundamental principles of democracy, for which American men are fighting and dying all over the world.
89 CoNG. REc. 10,656 (1943) .. See also 90 CoNG. REc. A3034 (1944) (statement of Rep. Dawson) ("Their only powers were those of persuasion."). But see 90 CoNG. REc. 6803, 6806 (1944)
(statement of Sen. Russell regarding a transportation strike in Philadelphia precipitated by the
union's assertion that compliance with an FEPC order to hire blacks as streetcar and motorcoach operators violated its contract with the Philadelphia Transportation Company:
They have asserted when before committees of Congress, and their sponsors have contended, that they had no power to enforce their directives, except that of an advisory nature.•.. When the F.E.P.C. press the button, they throw into action every agency of the
Federal Government, from the War Manpower Commission to the armed might of the
United States Army and the Navy.).
30. See 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951); 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953); 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); see
also Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 2, at 13 n.27. Ultimately, President Kennedy's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which had a similar focus, gained enforcement powers
including authority to publish the names of parties in noncompliance, recommend civil and criminal actions by the Department of Justice, terminate the contracts of noncomplying employers,
and prohibit entering into additional contracts with violators unless the party could show that
the discriminatory policies no longer existed. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 3, at 4.
The Committee also administered a vast program to encourage voluntary cooperation under the
title "plan for progress." Id.
31. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY, supra note 3, at 7.
32. See, e.g., H.R. 3096, H.R. 3994, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 7412, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942); H.R. 1732, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); S. 2048, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); H.R.
2232, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S. 101, S. 459, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 5216, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); H.R. 2824, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 984, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947); H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. 174, S. 1728, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R.
6841, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. 552, H.R. 2092, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. 551, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. 3368, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H.R. 647, H.R. 1253, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953); S. 1, S. 692, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R. 3306, H.R. 3393, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955); S. 899, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 10,968, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 144,
H.R. 3615, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 506, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R. 354, H.R. 908,
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nell in the 81st Congress (1950) - the only antidiscrimination bill of
this type to pass either house during this period - illustrates the contentious nature of the enforcement issue. The McConnell bill would
have established a permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission
that relied solely on the dissemination of information, the provision of
technical assistance, and voluntary conciliation to achieve its objective
of eliminating "discrimination because of race, creed, or color in employment relations." 33 In adopting this measure, the House rejected a
stronger FEPC bill authored by future Education and Labor Committee Chairman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. The Powell bill made it an
"unlawful employment practice ... to refuse to hire, to discharge, or
otherwise to discriminate" in the terms of employment on the basis of
"race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin." 34 The Powell bill
also established a five-member FEPC to provide technical assistance
and conciliation services and to receive and investigate individual
charges of discrimination. Upon a finding of an unfair employment
practice, the Commission would have had the power to issue cease and
desist orders and to seek enforcement by the federal appellate courts.
The House, not yet ready to create an enforcement mechanism against
discriminatory employers, substituted the McConnell version for the
more stringent Powell measure by a vote of 222 to 178.35
In the Senate, neither the companion measure to the Powell bill,
introduced by Senator McGrath, nor the House-passed version of the
McConnell bill ever received consideration on the merits as the Senate
failed to invoke cloture to end a filibuster of the FEPC bill. 36 In that
setting, the question of enforcement power was among the most divisive issues. Some Senators viewed an antidiscrimination commission
with authority to compel employers to abide by equal employment opportunity guidelines as un-American. 37 Following the Senate's failure
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 1999, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 104, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); s. 1258, S. 1819, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 10,144, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962);
H.R. 405, H.R. 3139, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. 1937, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963); H.R.
7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); see also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
33. H.R. 6841, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1950).
34. H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a)(l) (1949) (as reported by the Committee on Education and Labor on Aug. 2, 1949).
35. 96 CoNG. REC. 2253 (1950).
36. "The FEPC defeat came in the form of failure to adopt a proposal to limit debate on a
motion to call up the FEPC bill. The vote was 52 for and 32 against. Since 64 favorable votes
were needed to invoke cloture, this means that FEPC is dead for this session." Senate in Mourning, WASH. STAR, May 21, 1950 (editorial), reprinted in 96 CONG. REc. A3949 (1950) (remarks
of Sen. Richard B. Russell).
37. A radio debate between Sen. Humphrey, an FEPC supporter, and Sen. Holland, an opponent, was reprinted in the Congressional Record at the request of Sen. Eastland. In response to
the question "Do you support and advocate a voluntary [FEPC]?", Senator Holland responded
that "you can't ram this kind of thing in America down the throats of the great majority of the
States . • . . [T]hose powers of compulsion are foreign to and incompatible with the American
system of law." Senator Humphrey responded that the FEPC legislation "carries with it, as all
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to invoke cloture, the Washington Star, in an editorial opposing a compulsory FEPC, noted that "[n]o other issue had been so shot through
with partisan politics as this one ...." 38 A New York Times editorial,
on the other hand, emphasized that "some form of compulsion is required.... [C]ommon sense ... indicates that the enforcement agency
should be able to fall back on legal sanctions if its efforts at persuasion
fail. There is no tyrannical power here, unless Congress and the Federal courts be viewed as instruments of tyranny." 39 This early debate
foreshadowed disagreements that continue today.
B. Judicial Enforcement as a Compromise
Congress carried the strategy of attacking employment discrimination through conciliation and persuasion into the language of Title VII
in 1964. In order to secure passage of an equal opportunity bill and
avoid a filibuster in the Senate, supporters were forced to compromise.40 The House Judiciary Committee reported an omnibus civil
rights bill that included a title which established an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to receive, issue, and investigate
charges of discrimination.41 Although the Commission could bring
civil actions against violators, this option was available only after the
Commission had failed to eliminate the discriminatory practice by "informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion."42 As part
of the trend toward limiting what opponents viewed as the potentially
unchecked power of the new administrative agency,43 the House bill as
reported adopted this scheme in lieu of the model reported by the
House Education and Labor Committee, which would have provided
the Commission direct enforcement power in the form of cease and
desist orders.44 The full Judiciary Committee also rejected a proposal
effective American law does, penalties for that recalcitrant antisocial minority which will not
abide by the decision of the majority." 96 CoNG. REc. A3025, A3028 (1950).
38. Senate in Mourning, supra note 36.
39. The FEPC Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1950 (editorial), reprinted in 96 CONG. REc.
A5144-45 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Adam C. Powell, Jr.).
40. [W]e are in a parliamentary situation where we do not dare adopt any amendment
which has not received the categorical approval of Representative McCulloch.
If we should do so, we might be forced to go to conference. If the House would not
accept the Senate amendments, and if the bill went to conference - that is, if the House
should let it go there, we would then be faced with the threat of a second filibuster.
110 CoNG. REc. 7215 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 3, at 3010.
41. EEOC LEGlSLATIVE HlsrORY, supra note 3, at 9-10, 2011-13.
42. H.R. 7152, §§ 707(a) & (b), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963),
reprinted in EEOC LEGlSLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2001, 2012.
43. Vaas, supra note 32, at 450-51 (referring to the "fear that the EEOC would develop into
an extensive octopus like the NLRB").
44. HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADDmONAL VIEWS OF HONORABLE GEORGE
MEADER, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2043, 2057; see also Vaas, supra note 32, at 435.
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reported by one of its own subcommittees that would have vested enforcement authority in one half of a bifurcated EEOC.45 As indicated
by committee member McCulloch:
A substantial number of committee members ... preferred that the ultimate determination of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary.
Through this requirement ... settlement of complaints w[ould] occur
more rapidly and with greater frequency. In addition ... the employer
or labor union w[ould] have a fairer forum to establish innocence ....46

Thus, the process of compromise regarding Title VII in the House was
a movement toward curtailing the authority of the EEOC to act unilaterally against discriminatory employers.47 Although a Commission
member was empowered to file a charge, and the Commission could
investigate and evaluate the reasonableness of the allegations and seek
conciliation, it would not have the power to adjudicate the complaint
and implement a remedy. Instead, the federal courts were designated
as the fairer, more appropriate arbiters on the sensitive question of
employment discrimination.
In the Senate, the House-passed omnibus civil rights bill was the
subject of extended procedural and substantive wrangling. Concurrent with the Senate's debate on the bill, a. bipartisan cadre of its supporters worked with the Department of Justice and key House
members to reach an acceptable compromise. These negotiations resulted in a pair of substitute amendments offered by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen.48 Described as "the most basic and far-reaching of
all the Senate amendments,"49 the revisions in the enforcement provisions further restricted the EEOC's role in ensuring compliance with
the antidiscrimination law. The amendment eliminated the EEOC's
ability to obtain court enforcement except when there was a pattern or
45. "The subcommittee bill called for procedures before the newly created [EEO] board,
followed by judicial review by the district courts • • • • The full committee substitute calls for
proceedings by the Commission in the U.S. district courts ••••" HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MINORITY REPORT UPON PROPOSED C!vIL RIGHTS Ac:r OF 1963, H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2062,
2087.
46. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AoomONAL VIEWS OF HONORABLE WILLIAM M.
McCULLOCH ET AL., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1963), reprinted in EEOC
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2122, 2150.
47. For a view that this process was less one of compromise and more an exercise of sheer
political power, see HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AoomONAL INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
HONORABLE WILLIAM c. CRAMER ON H.R. 7152, H. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 2114, 2117 ("No purpose
would be here served by a recitation of how the 'compromise' was drafted or who participated in
it. Although I was a member of the subcommittee that considered the matter for months, I was
not invited to participate nor was I informed of its contents until 10:30 p.m. when a Justice
Department messenger delivered my copy on the Monday before the Tuesday meeting.").
48. Amend. No. 656, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 11,926 (1964); Amend. No.
1052, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. 13,310 (1964); see also Vaas, supra note 32, at 445·
46.
49. Vaas, supra note 32, at 452.
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practice of resistance by an employer. In cases of individualized discrimination, the agency could do no more than seek conciliation. so
As congressional compromise diminished the EEOC's ability to secure compliance from violators, there was a concomitant increase in
the individual complainant's role in enforcement. To assuage the concerns of critics who feared an EEOC with little accountability, legislators virtually eliminated the Commission from the enforcement
process. Still requiring some enforcement mechanism to gain support
from members of Congress who favored a strong EEOC, the negotiators deposited the burden of enforcement squarely on the complainant. 51 As part of the deal, procedures to facilitate claimants' ability to
enforce their rights were added to the Senate bill. The bill authorized
courts to appoint an attorney to represent the party aggrieved, to permit commencement of the action " 'without payment of fees, costs, or
security,' " and to grant the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs. 52 In addition, the Senate struck the House requirement
that an individual obtain permission from one Commissioner to proceed in court.
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he most significant feature of
the Title VII enforcement scheme is that it lodges the formal power of
adjudication exclusively in the courts, rather than giving quasi-judicial
power to an administrative agency." 53 Furthermore, as part of the
final compromise, in individual cases only the person aggrieved may
utilize this judicial enforcement mechanism; no one may sue on that
person's behalf. Certainly such a scheme was not the first choice of
either the opponents of Title VII, who would have preferred a strictly
50. A staff member of the Senate Judiciary Committee summarized the change in a
memorandum:
The Senate amendment struck out the power of the [EEOC] to enforce this title of the bill in
court suits.... Its function now is limited to an attempt at voluntary conciliation of alleged
unlawful practices • • . • Under the Senate amendment only an aggrieved person can bring
suit against an employer unless there is a pattern or practice of resistance • . • . The Commission cannot institute suit at all.
110 CoNG. REc. 14,331 (1964) quoted in, Vaas, supra note 32, at 452.
51. George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 688, 691 (1980).
This allocation of enforcement powers among administrative proceedings, public actions,
and private suits was the result of a series of compromises that steadily diluted the power of
the EEOC to prosecute and decide cases, and steadily strengthened the power of private
individuals to sue and of federal judges to adjudicate.
Id. at 692.
52. Vaas, supra note 32, at 453. These provisions were "part of the price which had to be
paid to secure bipartisan agreement on striking out the power of the EEOC to enforce Title VII
by court action." Id. at 454; see Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil
Rights Act of1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 430, 433 (1965) ("The leadership compromise completed
the attenuation of the Commission by divesting it of all enforcement power and denying it access
to the courts, but in return every grievant was granted the opportunity to seek redress in the
federal courts."). For a discussion of the anticipated impact of provision of attorney's fees, see R.
Wayne Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7
B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 495, 501-06 (1966).
53. Walker, supra note 52, at 495 (footnotes omitted).
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voluntary employment discrimination plan, or of the proponents, who
might have opted for a strong EEOC with authority to adjudicate
claims and issue cease and desist orders. Nevertheless, the individual's
ability to press his or her claim in court was central to the reaching of
a ceasefire in the 534-hour Senate battle over the bill54 and ultimately
to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As the linchpin in this
elaborate compromise, preservation of complainants' access to court
remains a central tenet of Title VII and must be borne in mind even as
the statute is interpreted almost three decades later.
C.

"In Writing Under Oath"

In contrast to the extensive legislative history documenting the
evolution of the Title VII enforcement provisions, the information
available regarding the impetus for the section 706(a) requirement that
a charge of discrimination be submitted "in writing under oath" 55 is
sparse. Fair Employment Practices legislation introduced prior to
1948 utilized language such as "[w]henever it is alleged," 56
"[w]henever the committee has reason to believe,"57 or "[w]henever it
is charged" 58 to describe the manner in which enforcement proceedings would be initiated. In 1947, however, members of the 80th Congress introduced changes in the language in FEPC bills to require that
a charge be filed under oath. First included in a bill introduced by
Senator Ives of New York on March 27, 1947,59 members of Congress
carried this concept forward through the intervening sixteen years60
and utilized it in Title VII as enacted.
54. "After 534 hours, one minute and thirty-seven seconds, the Senate voted cloture."
Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 2, at 12.
55. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(a), reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 1011 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988)).
56. S. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b) (1945).
57. H.R. 1732, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5.2 (1943).
58. S. 2048, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(b) (1944).
59. S. 984, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1947).
60. See, e.g., H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1949) ("[w]henever a sworn written
charge has been filed"); S. 174, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1949) (same); S. 1728, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 7(b) (1949) (same); H.R. 552, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1951) (same); H.R. 2092, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1951) (same); S. 551, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1951) (same); S. 3368,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(b) (1952) (same); H.R. 647, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1953) (same):
H.R. 1253, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1953) (same); S. 692, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1953)
(same); H.R. 3306, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1955) (same): H.R. 3393, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7(b) (1955) (same); S. 899, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1955) (same): H.R. 1096, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 7(b) (1956) (same); H.R. 144, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1957) (same); H.R. 3615,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1957) (same); S. 506, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1957) (same);
H.R. 354, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1959) (same); H.R. 908, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b)
(1959) (same); S. 1999, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1959) (same); H.R. 104, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 7(b) (1961) (same); S. 1258, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(b) (1961) (same); S. 1819, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 7(b) (1961) (same); H.R. 10144, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a) (1962) ("[w]henever it is
charged in writing under oath"); H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(a} (1963) (as reported
with amendments by House Committee on the Judiciary) (same).
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The source of the oath requirement appears to have been the New
York state FEPC law with which Senator Ives had been strongly associated as a member of the New York State Assembly and upon which
he had modeled his Senate legislation. 61 The New York "Law Against
Discrimination," which was enacted in 1945, created a state agency
"with power to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment
because of race, creed, color or national origin." 62 Under the New
York law, "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice may ... make, sign and file with the commission a verified complaint in writing."63 The adoption of the oath from
the New York law was likely in response to objections by opponents of
a fair employment bill in the 79th Congress that authorized a Fair
Employment Practice Commission to act "[w]henever it is alleged that
any person has engaged in any such unfair employment practice."64
During a filibuster of that bill, Senator Olin Johnston of South Carolina, after quoting this section of the bill, commented: "Senators will
notice the word 'alleged.' When newspapers start to say something
about me down home which they might not be able to prove, they just
start by saying, 'It is alleged that Olin Johnston did so and so.' ... It is
easy to allege something." 65 In the following Congress, when the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported Senator Ives' bill,
the report stated:
Critics of earlier legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment
laid much stress on the alleged procedural weaknesses of those bills. S.
984 seeks to provide every possible protection for those coming under its
jurisdiction. . . .
. . . [I]t sets up safeguards against irresponsible complaints by limiting the period within which complaints may be filed [and] by requiring
that a sworn written charge be filed . . . .66

From these sparse legislative clues, it appears that Senator Ives included the oath requirement to preclude opponents from raising the
specter of frivolous claims. Because Senator Johnston did not offer
any evidence that the complaint process had been misused under existing state FEPC laws, it is uncertain whether this objection was
raised out of genuine concern or as a simple political diversion. It is
similarly unclear whether legislators considered the oath requirement
an essential aspect of the Commission's administrative procedures or
61. "The FEPC law in New York is better known as the Ives-Quinn law, bearing the name of
that fine Republican gentleman, Irvin Ives, who was since elected junior United States Senator
from the State of New York ••.." 94 CoNG. REc. 9532 (1948) (statement of Rep. Multer).
62. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 118, § 125, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457, 458.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Law Against Discrimination, ch. 118, § 132, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457, 461.
S. 101, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. § lO(b) (1945) (emphasis added).
92 CoNG. REC. 395 (1946).
S. REP. No. 951, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1948).
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instead viewed it as an expedient and seemingly harmless way of
quashing one of the many criticisms produced by FEPC opponents.
The inclusion of a requirement that a charge be filed under oath
was carried over from this early legislation to most subsequent FEPC
legislation. Although commentators have noted that "[s]eldom has
similar legislation been debated with greater consciousness of the need
for 'legislative history,' or with greater care in the making thereof, to
guide the courts in interpreting and applying the law,'' 67 nothing in
the congressional debates over Title VII indicates the significance of
the oath requirement.
On July 29, 1966, the EEOC first promulgated regulations that
some courts68 perceive as conflicting with the oath requirement contained in the language of the Title VII statute. 69 The relevant regulations permit submission of timely unsworn complaints provided that
claimants subsequently verify them. "The purpose of this amendment
[to the Title VII regulations] is to describe more clearly the present
Commission policy with respect to the filing and amendment of
charges ...." 70 Evidently, the EEOC had consistently accepted subsequently verified unsworn complaints as valid charges since the enactment of Title VII. This regulation has been operative since
promulgated and Congress has never required the EEOC to conform
to the apparent statutory requirement that charges be filed in writing
under oath.
Examination of relevant parts of Title VIl's lengthy legislative history reveals a movement from efforts to encourage voluntary compliance with nondiscrimination laws to a system which mandates equal
employment opportunity. At the same time, the Act's enforcement
procedures shifted away from a soon-to-be-established administrative
agency and into the hands of the judiciary. In the end, Congress created an agency obligated to protect the right to a discrimination-free
workplace but wholly lacking the power necessary to effectuate this
policy. This system could function only if the drafters expected dissatisfied complainants - private litigants - to shoulder much of the
burden of enforcing Title VII. 11
67. Vaas, supra note 32, at 444. Because the House·passed bill, H.R. 7152, was not referred
to a Senate Committee, there was no Senate report or opportunity to clarify troubling provisions;
therefore legislative history created during floor debate was particularly important in expressing
the Senate's intent regarding the bill.
68. See infra section II.A.
69. 31 Fed. Reg. 10,269 (1966).
70. Id.
71. Note, Protection from Employer Retaliation: A Suggested Analysis for Section 704(a), 65
VA. L. REv. 1155, 1155 n.2 and accompanying text (1979) ("Title VII places major responsibility for enforcing compliance with its policies, through either formal or informal conciliation, on
the individual complainant.").
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OATH REQUIREMENT

With varying degrees of success, the federal courts have grappled
with the problem of reconciling the language of Title VII and the
EEOC's regulations. This Part describes and critiques the three approaches that the federal courts have taken in interpreting the section
706(b) oath requirement when that interpretation is determinative of
whether an individual may pursue her claim in court. 72 Section II.A
discusses those courts that have given no weight to the EEOC's regulations and have instead strictly enforced the statutory oath requirement. Section II.B examines the increasing number of courts that
emphasize the remedial nature of Title VII by treating an intake questionnaire as a valid charge for the purposes of fulfilling the filing limitations period. Section II.C analyzes a final group of courts that view
an intake questionnaire as sufficient to meet the timely filing requirement if the EEOC treats the questionnaire in the manner it would a
valid charge. Section 11.D concludes that the second group of decisions, which has adopted the "Remedial Approach," 73 best serves the
goals of Title VII.
A. No Oath, No Charge
The Fourth Circuit and some district courts of Massachusetts, Virginia, and Illinois have held that section 706(b)'s requirement that
charges be filed in writing under oath "is cast in mandatory terms" 74
and therefore an unswom intake questionnaire is insufficient to satisfy
the filing limitations period. While offering differing rationales for
their unwillingness to examine the language of the statute more than
superficially, each court applied the provision in a mechanical fashion
without regard to important underlying goals of Title VII. In EEOC
v. Appalachian Power Co., 75 an EEOC Commissioner filed a charge
without obtaining verification. 76 The district court dismissed the case
on the ground that the unswom charge was invalid and thus the
72. See 4 Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.), 1146,245 (Apr. 16, 1991)
(describing the split among courts on treatment of subsequently verified intake questionnaires).
73. See infra section 11.B.
74. EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 568 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1978).
75. 568 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1978).
76. Although this case involved a charge filed by a Commissioner rather than one filed by a
private plaintiff, the reasoning is relevant because the 1972 amendments to Title VII extended the
oath requirement to the Commission. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the statute authorized a
Commissioner to file a charge of discrimination only when "he has reasonable cause to believe a
violation of this title has occurred." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78
Stat. 241, 259 (amended 1972). The 1972 amendments eliminated this distinction between Commission charges and private charges. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Shell Oil
Co., 466 U.S. 54, 76 (1984), "[t]he only plausible explanation for that change is that Congress
wished to place a Commissioner on the same footing as an aggrieved private party: neither was
held to any prescribed level of objectively verifiable suspicion at the outset of the enforcement
procedure."
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EEOC and the court lacked jurisdiction.77 Rejecting an examination
of legislative history, the district court stated "the language [of the
statute] is plain and unambiguous," and indicated that "to dilute the
oath requirement and hold it only directory ... would be tantamount
to ignoring the congressional language."78 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 79
By truncating its analysis at this point, the Appalachian Power
court ignored an emerging body of law holding that Title VII should
be liberally interpreted to effectuate an underlying policy of nondiscrimination. As stated by the Fifth Circuit:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides a clear mandate from Congress that no longer will the United States tolerate this form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to make sure that the Act
works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a
strict construction of the statute and a battle with semantics. 80

Subsequent to Appalachian Power, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that Title VII should be construed broadly to carry out congressional intent to eradicate employment discrimination. 81 Rather
than seeking to interpret the statutory language to effectuate congressional goals82 or relying on the EEOC's regulations, the Appalachian
77. EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1294, 1295-96 (W.D.
Va. 1976). This case occurred prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982), which established that the filing of a valid, timely charge is not a
jurisdictional requirement but instead operates like a statute of limitations which is subject to
equitable tolling. 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). The reasoning of the court remains relevant because
post-Zpes courts have applied it in dismissing cases (though not on jurisdictional grounds).
78. Appalachian Power Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1295.
79. EEOC v. Appalachian Power Co., 568 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1978).
80. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted in Douglas
A. Schaaf, Title VII - Timely Filing Requirement in Deferral States ls Satisfied When the Initial
Complaint Is Received by the EEOC Within the 300-Day Limitation of 706(e}, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 396, 405 n.44 (1980); see also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Chambers &
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 14 n.36 and accompanying text ("In short, the courts treated Title VII
as a broad remedial statute designed to change fundamentally the patterns of employment dis·
crimination which had become ossified in the labor market."). But cf. Baldwin County Welcome
Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 (1984) (holding that there is "no satisfactory basis for giving
Title VII actions a special status under the [Federal] Rules of Civil Procedure").
81. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) ("[W]e honor the
remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the
filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
807, 818 (1980) ("It is unquestionably true that the 1964 statute was enacted to implement the
congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices, and that that basic policy
must inform construction of this remedial legislation.") (footnote omitted).
82. In Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972), the Supreme Court approved an EEOC procedure whereby after receiving a written charge, the EEOC orally referred it to a state agency,
"and then formally filed once the state agency indicated that it would decline to take action,"
without the benefit of an additional written charge. 404 U.S. at 525. The Court, in an effort to
provide broad coverage, reasoned that nothing in the statutory language precluded the interpretation advanced by the plaintiff: "Nothing in [Title VII] suggests that the state proceedings may
not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant
himself, nor is there any requirement that the complaint to the state agency be made in writing
rather than by oral referral." 404 U.S. at 525. The same reasoning could have been applied in
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Power court enforced the statute in a formalistic manner.
Turning a similarly deaf ear to the Supreme Court's statements
that Title VII be liberally construed, the district court of Massachusetts, in Hamel v. Prudential Insurance Co., 83 rejected the plaintiff's
argument that a timely filed intake questionnaire was adequate to preserve her right to file in court, stating that "[a]ny suggestion that th[e]
distinction [between an unswom intake questionnaire and a charge
filed under oath] is formalistic tends to ignore the significance of a
perjury conviction." 84 By use of the inflammatory term perjury, the
court shifted the focus of Title VII from protecting employees from
discrimination to protecting employers from employees and employees
from themselves. The court ignored longstanding EEOC regulations
that provide for verification of a charge subsequent to its filing, thus
reducing the risk of perjury while preserving the victim's cause of action. After rejecting several other arguments, 85 the Hamel court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Sensitive to the
disproportionately severe consequences of its rigid interpretation of Title VII, the court defensively commented that "[q]uestions of 'technicality' go to enactment, not interpretation."86 This :finger-pointing,
however, did little to mask the fact that the court declined to follow
the Supreme Court's lead in interpreting Title VII in light of its underlying goals. Instead, the court seemed to indicate it would interpret
the statute literally until Congress made explicit its apparent intent
that the oath requirement, like the rest of Title VII, be liberally
construed.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has taken a
similarly rigid approach. In a series of cases with influence outside the
Seventh Circuit, 87 most notably Proffit v. Keycom Electronic PublishAppalachian Power because§ 706(b) does not indicate when in the filing process a charge must be
verified.
83. 640 F. Supp. 103 (D. Mass. 1986).
84. Hamel. 640 F. Supp. at 105.
85. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the filing period should be equitably tolled
due to administrative error and delay by the EEOC in sending her the charge. Noting that the
plaintiff was represented by counsel and that she had waited seven months before completing an
intake questionnaire, the court determined that tolling would be inappropriate, though it might
have been proper if plaintiff had proceeded pro se. 640 F. Supp. at 105. The court also found
that even if the intake questionnaire were deemed a charge, the claim would not have been timely
due to the failure to file with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, a prerequisite for obtaining the 300-day federal filing period. 640 F. Supp. at 105-07.
86. 640 F. Supp. at 107.
87. See, e.g., Sparkman v. Combined Intl., 690 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Proffit v.
Keycom Elec. Publishing, 625 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Austin v. Russell County Sch. Bd.,
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1749, 1750 (W.D. Va. 1990) (citing Sparkman in support of the
statement that "a signed intake questionnaire is not a writing under oath"); Graf v. K-Mart
Corp., 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1370, 1373 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Proffit for the
proposition that "an intake questionnaire is not the same as an EEOC charge"); Buffington v.
General Time Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1186, 1193 (M.D. Ga. 1988) (relying on Proffit for the proposition that a "[q]uestionnaire does not constitute a sufficient 'charge' "); Hamel v. Prudential Ins.
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ing 88 and Sparkman v. Combined International, 8 9 several judges of the
district court for the Northern District of Illinois have explicitly rejected the EEOC's regulations permitting subsequent verification of a
timely intake questionnaire, finding that they exceed the authority of
the underlying statute.9 Faced with a situation in which the individual employee plaintiff filed a claim ten days after the statute had run,
even though the EEOC had sent her the charge for signature more
than two months earlier, the Proffit court stated that if the plaintiff
had acted promptly, it might have been more inclined to "stretch the
meaning of a 'charge' to include an Intake Questionnaire."9 1 In
Sparkman, EEOC employees wrongly led the plaintiff to believe her
questionnaire was sufficient to initiate formal proceedings. The court,
while noting the harsh result of its decision, seemed to agree with the
Proffit court that the Title VII statute "gives [the] EEOC the power to
prescribe [only] the informational content and form of the sworn
charge," 92 stating that "'implementing regulations or administrative
procedures cannot override their authorizing statute.' " 93 Thus, the
regulations permitting amendment were unenforceable and a subsequently filed sworn charge was ineffective to rescue her claim.
The application of the Proffit reasoning to the Sparkman facts
demonstrates one shortcoming of this formalistic interpretation of the
section 706(b) oath provision. Proffit, while establishing a rule that
the EEOC's regulations are unenforceable, implied that on different
facts it might react more sympathetically. The Sparkman court, faced
with such sympathetic facts, strictly applied the Proffit ruling and declined to address the merits of the claim. Neither case accounts for
the remedial intent of Title VII or acknowledges the deference arguably due the EEOC's regulations. 94 Although the Seventh Circuit re-

°

Co., 640 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D. Mass. 1986). The Hamel court approved of the statement in
Proffit that Casavantes v. California State Univ., Sacramento, 732 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1984), see
infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text, is "unpersuasive and another hard case making bad
law."
88. 625 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
89. 690 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
90. See Mason v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 46 Fair. Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1310, 1312
(N.D. Ill. 1987) ("[E]ven if the EEOC considered the Intake Questionnaire to be a charge, the
EEOC has no authority to dispense with the statutorily mandated oath."); Sparkman, 690 F.
Supp. at 724) ("[I]rrespective of EEOC's administrative view of the intake questionnaire, it does
not satisfy the controlling statutory definition.") (quoting Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 403); Proffit,
625 F. Supp. at 403 ("First, of course, there is the fundamental principle that implementing
regulations or administrative procedures cannot override their authorizing statute."); see also
Ferch v. Syncor Intl. Corp., 56 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 876 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
91. Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 405.
92. Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 403.
93. Sparkman, 690 F. Supp. at 724 (quoting Proffit, 625 F. Supp. at 403).
94. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) ("[I]t is axiomatic
that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility,
need not be the best one . . . • Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need
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cently rejected the position taken by its district courts,9s whether this
rejection will diminish the attractiveness of their reasoning to courts
outside the Seventh Circuit that previously had adopted the Northern
District of Illinois' position96 remains to be seen.
A more flexible interpretation of the oath requirement need not
undermine congressional concern for protecting employers from frivolous or' untimely claims. For instance, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted defendant's motion for snmmacy
judgment in Austin v. Russell County School Board. 97 The plaintiff in
Austin failed to file a timely charge even though the EEOC repeatedly
informed her that her intake questionnaire and correspondence were
insufficient to initiate proceedings against her former employer.
Although the EEOC sent the plaintiff a confidential affidavit which
would have functioned as her sworn statement, she never returned it.98
Further, the court's opinion suggests that she never submitted any
type of sworn document. 99 In refusing to treat the signed questionnaire as a formal charge, the court cited Appalachian Power, Hamel,
and Sparkman, and stated that it declined to "encourage such blatant
disregard for the law as exercised by the plaintiff."1 00 Fmding further
that the plaintiff's employer did not mislead her as to the cause of her
discharge, the court rejected her claim that the filing period should be
tolled. A policy permitting subsequent verification, as allowed by the
EEOC's regulations, would not save a claimant in this situation. Title
VII clearly demands that a claimant ultiriiately swear to a charge and
on these facts the court's expressed concern is valid. The strict rule it
applied, however, may be misused if a clearer policy or rule is not
articulated.
These courts, categorized as the "No Oath, No Charge" group, fail
to accommodate the dominant view that Title VII be liberally construed in favor of alleged victims of employment discrimination.101
Both the Supreme Court and its observers have arrived at the concluonly be reasonable to be entitled to deference."); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Udall v. Tallman, 3&0 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
95. The district court decisions hold that the statute requires that n complaint be in writing
and under oath or affirmation before it can be considered n chnrge for purposes of Title Vll.
Therefore, those courts have held that the EEOC is exceeding the nuthorily or the statute in
allowing a written statement to constitute a charge for purposes or the time 00.r before the
statement is verified by oath or affirmation. ••• We ••• hold that nn intake qucstiorumirc
which is later verified may be sufficient to constitute a chnrge in some circumstnnces.
Philbin v. General Elee. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added). Philbin is discussed at greater length in section ILC. See infra notes 128-30 nnd nccompanying text.
96. See cases cited supra note 87.
97. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1749 (W.D. Va. 1990).
98. Austin, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1749.
99. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1750.
100. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1750.
101. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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sion that Title VII is to be interpreted in a flexible manner to facilitate
the congressional goal of "assur[ing] equality of employment opportunities" and "eliminat[ing] ... discriminatory practices and devices." 102
This underlying belief has led the courts to opt repeatedly for a less
technical interpretation of the statute's intricate filing procedures. The
Supreme Court noted in Love v. Pullman Co. 103 that "technicalities are
particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen,
unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process." 104 In light of these
firm statements that Title VII is "a remedial statute to be liberally
construed in favor of the victims of discrimination," 105 an interpretation that would bar a claim because it was signed but unverified at the
time of filing is too exacting. The filing procedure should comply with
the intent of the Act 106 rather than serve only the letter of the law.
Furthermore, an interpretation that unduly inhibits the ability of complainants to pursue their claims in court undermines the private enforcement component of Title VII, which was essential to the
compromise that ultimately led to its enactment. 107
B.

The Remedial Approach

In stark contrast to the approach taken by the courts discussed in
section II.A, a second group of courts represented by the Fifth, 108
Sixth, 109 Ninth, and Tenth Circuits has relied on the underlying remedial intent of Title VII by permitting plaintiffs who filed timely intake
questionnaires to pursue their claims in court despite verification subsequent to the expiration of the filing limitations period. In an early
case, Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 110 the Fifth
Circuit noted:
"The legislative history is silent on the requisites of the charge.... It is
in keeping with the purpose of the Act to keep the procedures for initiating action simple. . . . All that is required is that it give sufficient information to enable EEOC to see what the grievance is all about." 111

The court reasoned further that the purpose of the procedural require102. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
103. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
104. Love, 404 U.S. at 527.
105. Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904
(1978).
106. See Love, 404 U.S. at 525 (1972) (holding that the filing procedure followed fully complied with the intent of the Act).
107. See supra section I.B.
108. The Fifth Circuit subsequently shifted its reasoning from relying exclusively on the re·
medial intent of Title VII to an approach that also considers the EEOC's treatment of the unveri·
fied charge. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
110. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
111. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 231 (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 30 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1968)).
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ments is to protect employers from frivolous charges and that such
protection is provided because "unswom charges are not served upon
respondents and . . . the investigation does not commence until a
sworn charge is served." 112 The Weeks court recognized the importance of keeping procedures for initiating action simple in a setting in
which complainants typically will proceed pro se. 113 The court also
recognized Congress' competing interests in facilitating resolution of
employment discrimination claims and protecting employers from unfounded claims. 114
In Casavantes v. California State University, Sacramento, 115 the
Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the proposition that " '[t]he Equal Employment Opportunity Act is a remedial statute.' " 116 It concluded
that the plaintiff's intake questionnaire filed 248 days after the alleged
discriminatory act, "in the context of both the amendment procedures
and the liberality to be ascribed to the procedural requirements, is sufficient to constitute a charge." 117 The court noted further that the
completed intake questionnaire provided sufficient information to
meet the requirements of the EEOC's regulations which allow for subsequent amendment and verification. Acknowledging the need to balance the interests of employers with those of the claimants, the court
stated that "[t]he charge intake process is principally designed to facilitate the processing of valid charges while screening out invalid
charges at the earliest possible time." 118
To achieve both goals identified by the Casavantes court, the largest reasonable number of charges should be permitted to reach the
investigation stage because it is the earliest point at which the validity
of most claims may be assessed. Requiring an oath significantly earlier
than the investigation stage prematurely narrows the complaint intake
funnel and needlessly screens out valid claims.
The Tenth Circuit, in Peterson v. City of Wichita, 119 relied heavily
on EEOC implementing regulations that permit amendment of a
charge "to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge." 120 The court stated that "the EEOC's interpretation
112. 408 F.2d at 231. The Sixth Circuit employed similar reasoning in Blue Bell Boots, Inc.
v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1969). The court concluded that congressional intent that
verification of charges prevent harassment of employers by reckless charges may be served by
requiring verification prior to EEOC action, but after the statutory filing period has run. See also
EEOC v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (W.D. Tenn. 1991).
113. 408 F.2d at 231.
114. 408 F.2d at 231.
115. 732 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1984).
116. Casavantes, 732 F.2d at 1442 (quoting Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978)).
117. 732 F.2d at 1443.
118. 732 F.2d at 1442.
119. 888 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1989).
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1988), cited in Peterson, 888 F.2d at 1308.
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of Title VII is entitled to deference if it is reasonable." 121 Ultimately,
like the Casavantes court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the regulation does not frustrate the purpose of the verification requirement,
which is to protect an employer from frivolous claims, because the
EEOC does not proceed to investigate a charge until it is verified."1 22
This Remedial Approach, adopted by a number of circuits, 123 pays
appropriate deference to the well-recognized congressional intent to
eradicate employment discrimination. As Justice O'Connor has instructed, deference to the EEOC's interpretation of its authorizing
statute is proper when "technical issue[s] of agency procedure"
arise. 124 In addition, unlike the No Oath, No Charge group, this position seeks to strike a balance between the goal of affording broad relief
under Title VII and the competing need to protect employers from
unnecessary, frivolous claims. Congress should strengthen this position further by amending the statute to coincide explicitly with the
EEOC's regulations.

C.

The EEOC Watchers

The final group of courts, which includes the Fifth125 and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals and some district courts of Pennsylvania
and. Georgia, finds the EEOC's treatment of an individual intake questionnaire determinative of whether it later may be viewed as a charge
for purposes of meeting the filing limitation period. Only where the
EEOC treats an intake questionnaire as it would an actual charge will
these courts accord it this status. These courts, some of which claim
to follow the Remedial Approach, 126 in fact reason that the EEOC's
acceptance of an intake questionnaire as a charge waives the requirement that a formal timely charge be submitted. 127 Among the factors
courts have considered in determining the status of a filing is whether
or not the EEOC assigned a charge number to the case upon receipt of
the intake questionnaire or notified the employer that a charge had
been filed against it.
121. 888 F.2d at 1309.
122. 888 F.2d at 1309.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 108·09.
124. EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 125 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. See supra note 108.
126. E.g., Price v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 687 F.2d 74, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating
that "[c]onsistent with the remedial purposes underlying Title VII, we construe employment
discrimination charges with the 'utmost liberality,' " but finding also that the EEOC's treating
the unverified complaint as a charge "is relevant"); see infra text accompanying note 132.
127. E.g., Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1968) ("If the Commission undertakes to process a charge which is not 'under oath' we perceive no reason why the
district court should not treat the omission of the oath as a permissive waiver by the
Commission.").
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In Philbin v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 128 the Seventh Circuit invoked the reasoning of the Remedial Approach to conclude that a subsequently verified intake questionnaire may in some
situations be considered a valid charge. 129 In determining that the
Philbin case was one of those situations, the court found that "the
Intake Questionnaire was treated as a charge by Philbin and the
EEOC.... The EEOC accepted the questionnaire and note and assigned a charge number to the claim. . . . [T]he EEOC then notified
Philbin's employer that a charge had been filed against it."1 30
Similarly, in Price v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 131 the Fifth
Circuit stated:
The fact that the Commission, at least at the initial stage of the proceedings, considered the circumstances surrounding the receipt of Price's
complaint sufficient to initiate the administrative process [including issuing an official notice of charge to Bell], is relevant to the determination
whether the interview [with an Equal Opportunity Specialist] and completion of Form 283 [Intake Questionnaire] constitutes a 'charge' within
the meaning of the statute ...."132
In each of these cases, the EEOC's treatment of the intake questionnaire was essential to the court's conclusion that the questionnaire
could fulfill the charge requirement.
Applying a similar rule to reach a different outcome, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Berger v. Institute of
Pennsylvania Hospital 133 relied on the fact that the EEOC did not
notify the plaintiff's employer that a charge had been filed against it
upon receipt of the timely but unverified intake questionnaire, but instead waited until the plaintiff filed an untimely sworn charge to send
notice to the employer. 134 The Berger court distinguished Price on the
basis that "the EEOC used [the information submitted by Price] to
send an official notice of charge to the employer/defendant." 135
Examining the EEOC's view of an intake questionnaire in a different light, in Buffington v. General Time Corp., 136 the District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia relied on the distinction the EEOC has
drawn between an intake questionnaire and a charge of discrimination
in determining that a timely questionnaire could not satisfy the filing
128. 929 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1991).
129. Philbin, 929 F.2d at 323.
130. 929 F.2d at 324.
131. 687 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1982).
132. Price, 687 F.2d at 78-79; see also EEOC v. Calumet Photographic, Inc., 687 F. Supp.
1249, 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("where the EEOC considers a private party's filing to be a charge,
the filing is a charge which tolls the statute").
133. No. 88-6650, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4956 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1989).
134. Berger, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4956, at *2.
135. Berger, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4956, at *4.
136. 677 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
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requirement. 137 The court cited an EEOC regulation 138 that states
that the EEOC shall receive information from any person, but
"[w]here the information discloses that a person is entitled to file a
charge with the Commission, the appropriate officer shall render assistance in the filing of a charge," 139 as evidence that the EEOC viewed
the questionnaire and the charge as distinct in both purpose and form.
While providing a more flexible standard in keeping with the intent
of the statute, the approach of the "EEOC Watchers" provides little
certainty and creates opportunities for uneven enforcement. The decision of an individual Intake Equal Opportunity Specialist to assign a
charge number or notify an employer upon receipt of an intake questionnaire, rather than to place the questionnaire in an appropriate suspension file or await submission of a formal charge, should not
determine whether a claimant receives a hearing on the merits. By
adopting the views of the EEOC on a claim-by-claim basis, the courts
defer to the individual judgment of hundreds of EEOC employees
across the nation. Variations in procedure and exercise of reasonable
discretion are unavoidable in a decentralized agency 140 which handles
the enormous volume of complaints received by the EEOC. The problem is caused not so much by the EEOC's handling of complaints but
by the inordinate significance the courts lodge in the actions of Commission personnel. Finally, a court's use of one EEOC regulation to
deny enforcement of another is an equally haphazard way of resolving
claims.

D. Summary
Currently, the courts utilize three overlapping approaches to determine whether a timely filed intake questionnaire may satisfy the statutory requirement that a charge of discrimination be filed under oath.
Although none of these methods is flawless, the failure of the No
Oath, No Charge group to accommodate the strong judicial statement
that Title VII be liberally construed is an unacceptable distortion of
the statute's underlying policy. The EEOC Watchers, whose reasoning seems constrained only by the whims of EEOC personnel, create a
system that provides for infinite flexibility but little predictability or
uniformity in enforcement. The Remedial Approach, although it
might not adequately address the possible conflict between the language of the Title VII statute and the EEOC's regulations, offers the
137. Buffington, 677 F.Supp. at 1193.
138. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 (1991).
139. 677 F. Supp. at 1193 (finding a distinction between an EEOC questionnaire and an
EEOC charge based on their different functions).
140. For a description of the structure of the agency, see 4 Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) 11 46,104 (Mar. 17, 1992) ("The EEOC has three types of field offices:
district, area, and local. There are currently 22 district offices, 18 area offices, and 9 local offices,
each of which is headed by its own Director.").
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best method of attaining the congressional goals of providing wide relief from employment discrimination, facilitating private enforcement
of worthy claims, and furnishing employers some level of protection
from frivolous claims.
III.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

In light of the shortcomings of two of the three existing treatments
of the oath issue by the courts, this Part proposes that Congress
amend Title VII to reflect the position of the Remedial Approach
group, 141 thus eliminating the apparent conflict between the statutory
language, the EEOC's regulations, and the emerging consensus position of the circuits. 142 Among the three approaches discussed, the
courts that construe Title VII liberally to provide victims of alleged
discrimination access to the courts come closest to effectuating congressional intent. This interpretation offers other advantages as well.
Section III.A argues that with the enormous backlog of complaints
that has developed at the EEOC, private enforcement is often a claimant's only hope for prompt resolution of a discriminatory situation and
thus should be facilitated. Section 111.B notes that under existing law,
when charges are filed with the EEOC under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, a law with intent similar to Title VII, they are
not required by statute to be verified at any point in the administrative
process. Section III.C proposes the text of the amendment and explains its effects. This Part concludes that the Remedial Approach
balances the interests of Title VII claimants and their employers in an
equitable manner. The statute should require that a charge be verified
prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation but not necessarily
prior to the expiration of the filing limitations period.

A.

The Need for the Private Attorney General

Almost from its inception the EEOC has labored under a burden
which far exceeds its expertise and resources. In its first year of operation, the agency received more than four times as many complaints as
anticipated. 143 Between 1969 and 1975 the number of charges filed
mushroomed from just over 12,000 to more than 71,000 annually. 144
More recently, the EEOC is widely reported as receiving 100,000
charges of discrimination every year.14s
141. See supra section 11.B.
142. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 11.3, at 431; 2 ARTHUR B. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 48.ll(b)(l) (1990 & Supp. 1991).
143. Belton, supra note 1, at 921 (stating that EEOC expected 2000 charges but received
8854).
144. Id.
145. Bruce D. Butterfield, Shunning Old Paths to Equality at Work; Affirmative Action Under
Fire, BosroN GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1991, at 1 (Business section); Anti-Bias Agencies Tum DeafEar to
Complaints, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1988, at 18 (Viewpoints section).
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The result of this overwhelming workload has been an immense
backlog of pending charges. The EEOC's Combined Annual Report
for FY 1986-1988 stated that at the end of fiscal year 1988 the
agency's pending inventory stood at 53, 780 charges. 146 Reportedly as
high as 126,000 in 1976, 147 this accumulation of charges has affected
the Commission's ability to provide complainants relief in at least two
ways. First, the EEOC is supposed to process charges within 180 days
of receipt 148 but seldom is able to achieve this goal. Although reported at 185 days in 1984, 149 by 1991 average processing time had
climbed to 284 days - more than nine months. 150 The inability to
provide reasonably prompt relief leaves those complainants who prefer
to await completion of EEOC efforts to resolve a claim before suing in
an uncomfortable limbo. Also, in some extreme cases, where the
EEOC moves so slowly that the equitable doctrine of !aches will apply
when a complainant finally does sue, this choice can foreclose opportunities for relief altogether. 151 Further, the agency's backlog has been
a convenient and obvious target for EEOC critics. 152 As a result,
146. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMMISSION, 1986-1988 CoMBINED ANNUAL
REPORT 7 (1990). Pending inventory is the current workload that exists in addition to charges
received during the fiscal year. For example, in fiscal year 1987 the EEOC had responsibility for
processing 62,074 newly received charges but resolved only 53,482 charges. The remainder became part of the pending inventory. In fiscal year 1988, the EEOC resolved 11,896 more charges
than it was required to process that year, thus the pending inventory declined slightly. Despite
this gain, the pending inventory is still equal to approximately 90% of the workload which the
EEOC is required to process each year. See id.
147. Richard I. Lehr, EEOC Case-Handling Procedures: Problems and Solutions, 34 ALA. L.
REv. 241, 246 (1983).
148. EEOC is granted exclusive jurisdiction over the charge for 180 days. After expiration of
180 days from the time of filing, the charging party may request a notice of right to sue, regard·
less of whether the agency has completed processing of the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988);
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(l) (1991).
149. ABA Panel Discusses Preparation of EEO Cases, Trial Strategies, Burdens of Proof in
Discrimination Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at A6 (July 10, 1985).
150. Butterfield, supra note 145. But see From Platform Plank to Landmark Law, Title VII
History Recounted at 25-Year Mark, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at Cl, C3 (May 16, 1989)
(quoting R. Gaull Silberman, vice chairman of the EEOC, that she expects the Commission soon
to reach its goal of six months processing time).
151. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.
1988) (rehearing en bane). In this case, due to the EEOC's backlog, it took 10 years for the
agency to undertake and complete an investigation, make a finding of reasonable cause, and
unsuccessfully seek conciliation. When the plaintiff finally sued, the court affirmed a grant of
summary judgment to the defendant, holding that !aches may apply in a Title VII suit and that
here, the EEOC's delay failed to justify the plaintiff's inaction.
152. GAO Says EEOC. State Agencies Not Fully Investigating Charges, 26 Govt. Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1287, at 1538 (Oct. 31, 1988) (discussing a General Accounting Office report
which found that the EEOC failed to reduce its massive backlog of cases); Employment, Women's Groups Urge Congress to Monitor Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Laws. Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 206, at A16, A17 (Oct. 24, 1991) (quoting Judith Lichtman, president of Women's Legal Defense Fund, that EEOC has been plagued by a large baqklog and slow response
time); Allen Greenberg, NAACP Sees Rising Job Discrimination Against Minorities, UPI, Jan. 12,
1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file (quoting NAACP attorney James Foster that
EEOC investigators are overwhelmed by a backlog of complaints).
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EEOC officials have felt compelled to restructure the charge processing system to maximize case closings, arguably at the expense of more
thorough but time consuming investigations. 153 This emphasis on improving the numbers makes the backlog figure an unreliable indicator
of the quality of service provided to complainants.
Demands for investigations of alleged employment discrimination
have consistently overwhelmed the EEOC. As a result, private litigants historically have shouldered much of the burden of developing
employment discrimination case law. 154 In recognition of this trend,
the EEOC has developed programs to expedite claimants' litigation
efforts, including "activities to develop and train a private Title VII
bar." 155 These activities range from educational seminars to maintenance of a panel of attorneys by each EEOC district office "to review
case files and provide legal assistance ... to charging parties" considering suits in federal court. 156 However, this is not enough to ensure
appropriate attention to each claim. Given the EEOC's mixed motives157 for reducing its backlog, elimination of these accumulated
charges would provide inadequate assurance that complainants were
receiving fair consideration of their claims. In this context, Congress
should amend the statute to facilitate the ability of victims of discrimination to pursue their claims in court rather than permit the courts to
rely on an overly technical interpretation of Title VII to dismiss
claims.
B. Filing Procedures Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act

Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) 158 and Title VII in response to similar problems. ADEA was
passed three years after Title VII to prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of age. The EEOC assumed responsibility for en153. Greenberg, supra note 152 (reporting that due to the EEOC's backlog, a "purported
quota requir[es] EEOC investigators to dispose of at least 85 cases a year''); ABA Panel, supra
note 149 (reporting that the EEOC "came under pressure from both management and civil rights
groups for placing so much emphasis on RCP," the Rapid Charge Processing system); Lee May,

Jobs Panel Failed to Properly Investigate Large Number ofBias Cases, Report Says, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1988, at Cl7 (quoting a GAO report that there existed "a perception by investigative
staff that EEOC was more interested in reducing the large charge inventory than in performing
full investigations").
154. Belton, supra note 1, at 924.
155. 4 Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) 1[ 46,110 (Mar. 17, 1992).
156. Id.
157. Although the EEOC may wish to reduce its backlog to be more responsive to complainants, it also has incentive to do so to quiet the agency's critics. Depending upon the method used
to achieve this goal, efforts to reduce the backlog could have a negative impact on the quality of
claims processing.
158. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)).
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forcement of ADEA on July 1, 1979. 159 Title VII and ADEA are
presumed to have comparable remedial intent and because the EEOC
assumed direct responsibility for ADEA, they are similarly administered and enforced. Further, the courts often construe ADEA in a
manner similar to Title VII. 160 Both statutes are triggered by the filing
of a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, and complainants under each statute must wait a prescribed
period while the EEOC seeks conciliation before pursuing their claims
in federal court. 161 Given these parallels, one would expect the related
statutory language on the filing of charges to be similar as well.
Despite the similarities in underlying intent and administrative
procedures, however, Title VII and ADEA have different statutory
requirements for filing a charge. While Title VII demands that a
charge be filed in writing under oath, ADEA is silent on the details of
an age discrimination claim. The regulations promulgated by the
EEOC fill this gap by requiring that, at a minimum, an ADEA charge
"be in writing," "name the prospective respondent," and "generally
allege the discriminatory act(s). Charges received in person or by telephone [are to] be reduced to writing." 162 This skeletal information
may be augmented under the same liberal amendment policy that governs Title VII charges. 163 Thus, because EEOC regulations allow the
additional statutory requirement for verification under Title VII to be
fulfilled through the amendment process, the EEOC handles the intake of charges filed under ADEA and Title VII virtually
identically. 164
The differences between the two statutes continue to narrow. Until
recently, ADEA, unlike Title VII, provided a two-year statute of limitations within which claimants had to file in court. 165 The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 166 however, deleted this ADEA provision, 167 and
159. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1366
(1988), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
160. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (White and Stevens, JJ., concurring)
(Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (relying on Title VII legislative history to interpret
ADEA); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, No. 89-1895, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2170 (1991)
(describing Title VII as a "closely parallel context" to ADEA); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n.11 (1982) (stating that ADEA "was modeled after Title VII"); Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that "ADEA and Title VII share a
common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace").
161. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988) with 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)
(1988).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6 (1991).
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(c) (1991).
164. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 764 n.11 (1979) (acknowledging that
ADEA complaints will be processed under the same system as Title VII complaints).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(l) (1988) (making applicable 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1988)).
166. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
167. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991).
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inserted new language that mimics that of Title VII. 168 Under the
revised Act, like a Title VII complainant, an individual filing under
ADEA would have ninety days from the time the EEOC notified him
or her of the termination of its proceedings - rather than two years
from the time of the alleged discriminatory act - to sue in federal
court. 169 As the administrative procedures for processing claims
under Title VII and ADEA move closer together, the remaining statutory differences become increasingly anomalous. It is apparent from
the EEOC's procedures that the practical effects of verifying a charge
at the time of filing are minimal in light of the agency's liberal amendment practices. Moreover, the EEOC receives and processes many
charges under ADEA, a statute which does not require verification
and which is substantially similar to Title VII, without significant ill
effects. Therefore, an amendment permitting a more flexible verification policy for charges filed under Title VII would not be overly
burdensome.
C. An Amendment to Section 706(b)
Section 706(b) should be amended to read in relevant part:
Charges shall be in writing [under oath or affirmation] and shall contain
such information and be in such form as the Commission requires ....
Any individual filing a complaint shall verify such complaint by oath or
affirmation prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation. If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and
promptly notify the person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent
of its action.17°
An amendment to section 706(b) specifying that charges must be
verified prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation would cause
little if any disruption of the existing relationship between the EEOC,
complainants, and their employers. The agency already operates
under a system that permits amendment of charges. Title VII requires
that the EEOC notify employers of complaints filed against them
within ten days of the EEOC's receipt of a charge. 171 Notice to employers enables them to retain all employment records which may be
168. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat 1071, 1079 (1991) ("29 U.S.C. § 626(e) is amended
... by adding at the end, the following: If a charge filed with the Commission under this Act is
dismissed or the proceedings of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission,
the Commission shall notify the person aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under this
section by a person defined in section l l(a) against the respondent named in the charge within 90
days after the date of the receipt of such notice."). For comparison to Title VII, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
169. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat 1071, 1079 (1991).
170. Text which would be deleted by the proposed amendment is enclosed in brackets. New
language appears in italics.
171. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
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relevant to the discrimination claim. 172 Such records not only facilitate the EEOC's investigation but also may assist an employer in preparing a defense.113 According to the Enforcement Manager of the
EEOC's Detroit District Office, the EEOC typically does not notify
employers that a complaint has been filed against them until the complainant verifies the charge. 174 However, if it appears likely that a
complainant will be unable to file a sworn charge before the statutory
period runs, notice will be sent to an employer on the basis of the
intake questionnaire. 175 This notice does not describe the nature of
the allegations contained in the unverified intake questionnaire, but
informs the employer that a claim has been filed against her. 176 Once
the complaint is verified, an employer receives an amended notice providing the date and place of the allegations and detailing the statutory
basis for the claim. 177 Only at this point may an EEOC investigator
proceed to request from the employer any relevant documents or
records. 178
In light of recent regulatory changes in record keeping requirements, any additional burden on employers from the proposed amendment would be minimal. Effective August 26, 1991, the EEOC
extended the mandatory retention period for all voluntarily created
employment records from six months to one year. 179 The EEOC explained that the six-month requirement "was promulgated before Title
VII was amended in 1972 to change the time limit for filing a charge
from 90 days to 180 days." 180 In light of the extended filing period, six
172. The EEOC's recordkeeping requirements are minimal. Each employer covered by Title
VII with 100 or more employers must submit annually and keep on hand Standard Form 100,
the Employer Information Report EE0-1, which classifies the workforce by sex and race. The
EEOC "reserves the right to impose [additional] recordkeeping requirements upon ••• employers
•.. when in its judgment, such records ••• are further required to accomplish the purposes of
title VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1602.12 (1991). Title VII grants such authority to the EEOC explicitly.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1988). If employers voluntarily create additional employment records,
the EEOC requires that they be kept for one year after their creation or the personnel action they
concern. 56 Fed. Reg. 35753, 35755 (1991) (amending 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1991)); see infra
notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
173. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 74-75 (1984) (stating that the reason that
Congress added the 10-day notice requirement in 1972 "seems to have been to provide employers
fair notice that accusations of discrimination have been leveled against them and that they can
soon expect an investigation by the EEOC"). The Court in Shell found that notice of a charge
must contain information sufficient to enable the employer to determine which records he or she
must retain for EEOC examination during the investigation stage. Shell, 466 U.S. at 78.
174. Telephone Interview with Earl L. Benson, Enforcement Manager, EEOC Detroit District Office (Nov. 15, 1991 and Jan. 28, 1992).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. The second notice relates back to the date of the first notice in the same way that
the amended (verified) charge relates back to the date of the intake questionnaire.
178. Id.
179. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,753 (1991).
180. Id. at 35,754.
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months was no longer sufficient to ensure that employers "necessarily
will have retained" records relevant to a charge.181 The Commission
stated further that the "retention of the records for the period of one
year will increase only minimally, if at all, the employer's cost of
maintaining the records." 182 This new requirement will decrease the
likelihood that employers receiving a general notice of a discrimination complaint will inadvertently dispose of employment records
which may prove helpful to them or to the EEOC. 183 Once the EEOC
notifies an employer of the content of a charge, all relevant records
must be retained until final disposition of the charge.184
Congress should amend Title VII to require only that verification
occur prior to the initiation of an EEOC investigation. Conforming
the statutory language to the EEOC's current practice as described
above would affect only those complainants who relied on the amendment procedure to verify their claims and subsequently chose to pursue their claims in court. For these complainants who are dissatisfied
with the EEOC's findings or for whom the EEOC is unable to obtain
relief by conciliation, the amendment would ensure that courts that
have refused to honor the EEOC's longstanding regulations permitting
amendment could no longer decline to examine the merits of a claim
on those grounds. Bringing these courts into conformity with the majority of the circuits would further the intent of Title VII and facilitate
uniformity in the resolution of employment discrimination claims.
CONCLUSION

The existing morass of statutes, regulations and common law that
determines the ability of Title VII claimants to pursue their claims in
court is filled with inconsistencies. In order to facilitate uniform treatment of Title VII claims in a manner that complies with the underlying intent of the statute, Congress should amend the requirement that
a charge be filed under oath to mandate instead that it be verified prior
to initiation of an EEOC investigation. This approach honors the remedial intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It also safeguards the
right of private enforcement, which was necessary to secure passage of
the original legislation and continues to be necessary due to the
181. Id.
182. Id.
The Commission estimates that the changes ... increasing the title VII records retention
period from six months to one year will result in an increased recordkeeping burden on
employers of approximately 9,000 burden hours annually..•• The Commission believes that
this increase in burden hours is de minimis and that the modifications will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small employers.
Id.
183. If necessary, the EEOC could extend further the retention period to provide additional
protection for employers who are concerned that they may prematurely dispose of relevant
records.
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14(a) (1991).
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EEOC's excessive workload. Moreover, the proposed amendment
shows appropriate deference to the EEOC's interpretation of its authorizing statute and provides adequate protection for employers from
frivolous claims.

